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School Discipline in Moral Disarray 
 
Abstract 
 
It is argued that current school disciplinary policies are ineffective 
instruments for delivering moral messages: they are poorly justified; fail to 
distinguish moral violations – violence, vandalism, deception – from conventional 
school-limited violations – attendance, dress codes, eating venues – leaving the 
impression that dress code violations and forgery are equivalent; conflate 
sanctions, including presumed punishments (detentions and suspensions), with 
other forms of corrections (conferences, positive and negative reinforcement) and 
apply them without distinction to moral and non-moral wrong-doing.   
To be morally instructive school disciplinary codes should separate three 
types of infractions – moral, derivatively moral, and conventional. The derivatively 
moral includes rules that while not moral in isolation – eating outside the cafeteria 
– become imbued with moral attributes under particular interpretations; 
conventional wrongs have no moral valence but are rules designed for orderly 
school management. Sanctions, too, should be applied differentially according to 
category of infraction. Punishment, if used, is appropriate only for intentional 
moral wrong-doing, connected to acknowledgement of culpability, and conditional 
upon a clear articulation of the school's moral objectives that is persuasive to 
children and the community.   
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If schools take seriously the moral development of students, their discipline 
policies should be a conduit for moral instruction. Because discipline is central to 
a school's ethos, if rules and sanctions are perceived as irrational, trivial, unfair, or 
arbitrary then other school efforts to support a moral outlook will likely be 
dismissed.  
The argument of this paper, that the moral component in current discipline 
policies is badly muddled, rests on disciplinary theory as well as a study of 50 
codes of conduct collected in Pennsylvania and a scattering of other American 
states. While the codes are neither a random nor complete sample of area 
schools, their striking similarity (in the enumerated offences and sanctions) 
provides a rationale for generalizations. Because discipline policies are weakly 
linked to the moral and educational purposes of schooling, there is little to break 
rule proliferation and coercive practices. Further, the rules and sanctions within 
the codes fail to distinguish moral from non-moral transgressions. When all 
peccadilloes are perceived as morally offensive and responded to with 
punishments or, contrariwise, no behaviour is deemed morally offensive, worthy of 
more than a corrective then, either way, discipline codes become trivial, losing 
potential moral clout.  
To counter these obstacles, it is suggested, discipline policies should 
distinguish offenses that offend the core of a schools (and society's) moral 
foundations from those situational and alterable rules that are merely instrumental 
to the institutions' smooth functioning. Once distinctions are made sanctions can 
be aligned and punishment restricted to genuine moral violations. 
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Discipline's weak warrant 
  School discipline appears to rest on three justifications: Discipline is 
intrinsic to academic mastery, embedded in the learning process itself; it 
establishes order in the classroom and order is the gateway for learning; it is an 
independent good – no school discipline, no obedience, no self-discipline. The 
first rationale, while adequately narrow, is largely disregarded by contemporary 
discipline policies, the other two are of questionable merit.  
Intrinsic to academic learning. Discipline, according to the highly regarded 
educational theorist R. S. Peters (1967), is submission to rules.  
The rules may be those of what is learned, e.g., the rules of grammar or of 
morals; they may be those of the method of learning, e.g., rules of practice 
and training; or they may be more general rules necessary for something 
to be learned, e.g., rules relating to silence, posture, and diet. … 
‘Discipline’ is thus a very general notion which is connected with 
conforming to rules (pp.173-174).  
Recasting Peters’ description, we can consider "rules" in terms of their 
proximity to an enterprise. At one extreme, not mentioned by Peters, discipline is 
the enterprise itself: knowledge domains – music, math, psychology, philosophy. 
Slightly removed from discipline as the enterprise is what Howard Gardner 
(2000) calls specialized "ways of thinking" (p.117), "habits of mind" (p. 125), and 
"modes of analysis" (p.145) associated with knowledge fields (Peters’ what is 
learned). It is the methodology of a field or the discipline of a discipline. Gardner 
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singles out science, mathematics, art, and history as examples of different 
domains, each with its particular disciplinary approach to investigation.  
Somewhat further detached from the endeavour discipline is an 
instrumental resource to fulfill a project, what John Dewey refers to as "mastery 
of the instruments of action" (1991, p.106) (Peter’s “rules of practice and 
training”). It is the skill that aids us in performing a task – the cobbler, becomes 
proficient at cutting leather, the musician practices the rules of harmony, the 
athlete drills in the techniques of his sport. Discipline without an intimate 
connection to a pursuit – a stand-alone habit (as in self-discipline) or submission 
to legitimate authority – is rejected by Dewey. "It goes without saying that 
discipline cannot be an end. We do not want discipline for the sake of itself, we 
want discipline for the sake of something else" (1966, p.106).  
For Dewey discipline is inseparable from the interest and attention a child 
brings to an endeavor. It is the thoughtful, honed, and steadfast manner of 
conducting a task achieved when a child’s desires are connected to, and shaped 
by, an educational objective. As rules are contained within a game, so discipline 
should be contained within an experience (Dewey, 1938).  
Order: Gateway to learning. A more modern interpretation decouples 
discipline from its close internal connection to particular endeavours considering 
it a precondition for all endeavors (Peters’ “more general rules necessary for 
something to be learned, e.g., rules relating to silence, posture, and diet”). The 
“more general rules,” what Dewey (1954) and Emile Durkheim (1961) call “school 
rules,” do not emerge from the task but from the authority of school personnel. 
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According to this take, silence, posture and diet, (attentiveness, persistence, 
restraint in today’s language) are gateway virtues for all learning. 
As discipline is distanced from the learning task and rests increasingly on 
the discretion of an authority, constraints on rule-making grow softer; both rules 
and rule-maker appear more ad hoc. Many, for example, will disagree that 
silence, posture, diet, even persistence and self-denial, are mandatory for 
learning. There is nothing to prevent good education in a noisy nudist colony. 
However, once school authorities justify the “general rules” of their choosing as 
promoting an essential tone – quiescent, orderly, controlled – required for 
education, limits on discretion dissipate. A major claim, often stated in preambles 
to disciplinary codes, is that rules are justified by the need for order, with order an 
obvious condition for learning.¹  As one district explains: 
"Order and discipline are essential to an effective, educational 
environment. A structured atmosphere of order and discipline allows 
constructive individual expression….The School District believes that 
everyone in the school community must play a role in contributing to an 
orderly environment and also believes that an orderly school environment 
requires a code of conduct” (emphasis added).  
Independent good.  From rules justified by order, it is a small step to rules 
justified for their own sake: Arguing with a teacher is condemned because it is 
discourteous; that is sufficient. Tardiness, talking in class, chewing gum are 
disruptive and disrespectful. Sporting a short hem line is immodest. It is 
admirable to obey the dress code, keep quiet, restrict food to the cafeteria 
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without further instrumental justification. With this rationale any rule will 
encourage restraint, delayed gratification, inhibition, and moderation as does the 
very act of submission. And any resistance or disobedience signals insufficient 
restraint.  
The infusion of school rules with elevated moral status was central to 
Durkheim’s classic work on school discipline. He believed that “discipline has a 
social usefulness in and of itself, quite apart from the behaviour it prescribes” 
(1961, p.37).  Whatever the teacher determined to be the proper “rules of 
conduct” children should obey, for without discipline the classroom “degenerates 
into unwholesome ferment, and a genuine demoralization sets in” (1961, p.151). 
Only by subjugating the will to restrictive obligatory rules can the child come, 
eventually, to exercise “effective autonomy.” Discipline, then, as a restraint 
against natural impulses rather than “for the sake of something else” (Dewey, 
1966, p.106), becomes an essential ingredient of moral development; the more 
of it the better. It is a view upheld by many today (Wynne and Ryan, 1997). 
Moreover, as obedience to rules overshadows their content, the focus of 
discipline increasingly shifts to sanctions – the procedures of enforcement. As 
Charles Wolfgang, in a major text on the subject, writes: “Discipline is the 
required action by a teacher or school official, toward a student (or group of 
students), after the student's behaviour disrupts the ongoing educational activity 
or breaks a pre-established rule or law created by the teacher, the school 
administration, or the general society" (1999, p. xi).  The rules are self-justifying; 
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the teachers’ task is to exact compliance. (See Alfie Kohn, 1996, for a rich 
critique of this position.) Discipline becomes the procedure of sanctioning.  
With this move we have arrived at the far end of the continuum: discipline 
is not the endeavor itself (the discipline of music), not "ways of thinking" 
(Gardner, 2000, p.117), not “mastery of the instruments of action" (Dewey, 1991, 
p.106), not even habits of restraint or self-control (Durkheim, 1961). It is the 
enforcement of sanctions securing submission to rules. Submission presumably 
produces a tone of self-restraint and orderliness in the school. Establishing the 
tone, in turn, enables the child to be taught the techniques of a subject. Finally, 
learning the techniques permits the child to adequately explore the subject matter 
(music) or activity (sport). The sequence of enforcement → submission → 
restraint and orderliness → skills → subject matter conveys the large justificatory 
burden of a discipline centered on sanctions. It is a long leap from imposing a 
detention for repeated dress code violations to solving a math problem. 
Merging rules and sanctions 
 Consider two hypothetical high school students, Susie and Sarah, both 
disciplinary problems but highly dissimilar in their offenses. Susie, preoccupied 
with her friendships and indifferent to her studies, is chronically late for school 
and often for class, wears skirts that sometimes fall short of the allowable dress 
code limits, and snacks outside the cafeteria. Otherwise she is well liked, 
cooperative, and the first to volunteer for chores or new initiatives. Sarah, 
academically ambitious but not conscientious, plagiarizes papers from the 
internet, and is not above forging an excuse note when she is unprepared for a 
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test. She is cynical about school, seeing it as a way-station to college which is 
where her attention is directed. Yet the children receive similar discipline. Susie 
receives a one day internal suspension for an unexcused absence or for eating 
outside the cafeteria twice (a third time results in a two day suspension). Sarah 
receives a one day internal suspension for forgery (on the second occasion; two 
days on the third). Plagiarism nets a two day internal suspension (second 
offense). School B is more apt to give detentions than suspensions, but again 
offenses are lumped. A three-to-five day detention is given to Susie for breaking 
the hem line rule (third occasion), for school tardiness (fifth occasion), and to 
Sarah for fraud or cheating (first occasion). In School C, Susie's violation of the 
dress code would warrant a Saturday in-school suspension (third occasion) as 
would Sarah's forgery (second occasion). For dishonesty in her work she simply 
gets no credit and that not until her third violation. 
While Susie is breaking school rules, tardiness, dress indiscretions and 
eating fall into what Larry Nucci (1989, 2001) and Elliot Turiel (2002) call the 
conventional, rather than moral, domain; they express customary values of a 
particular institution without the universality attributed to morality. Contrariwise, 
Sarah’s actions are clear moral violations; they injure the integrity of her 
relationship with the teacher (who assumes the papers are her own and the 
excuses signed by a parent) and give her an unfair advantage. One could 
imagine a school that stressed morality yet permitted Susie’s behaviours but not 
one that permitted Sarah’s. However, when it comes to consequences there is no 
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distinction in the type of sanction administered to each girl and rather little in 
amount; any moral messages are thereby muted.  
Although schools tend to collapse moral and conventional offenses, they 
do have ways of categorizing misbehaviour: by place of occurrence, who 
sanctions (teacher, administrator, police), degree of disruption, type of measure, 
sometimes alphabetically. Sanctions increase when the behaviour is more 
frequent, visible (out of the classroom), disruptive, and criminal (drugs, tobacco, 
weapons, assault, vandalism, setting off fire alarms). There is thus, at least 
impliedly, a gradation of punishment that parallels degree of wrong-doing. Still, 
cheating, plagiarizing, tardiness, and dress offences are regularly bracketed 
together in the codes, usually at a low level of seriousness. 2
Just as the distancing of discipline from learning opens space for 
moralizing rules, so too the distancing of sanctions from rules opens space for 
moralizing sanctions. Detentions and suspensions appear to be punitive, not 
problem solving, approaches. A school disciplinarian has condemned the child, 
separated her from the group, and restricted her movement. The primary 
message sounds like:  “this is what you get for doing x” rather than, “what’s the 
best way to help you not repeat x”? 
In contrast to other sorts of correctives (discussion, assistance, 
suggestion, natural consequences, positive and negative reinforcement), the 
resort to punishment gives school sanctions a moral imprimatur, for punishment 
is usually associated with moral culpability, and presumptively experienced as 
such (following John Kleinig, 1973). It is a tool for society's expression of 
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“attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and 
reprobation, either on the part of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in 
whose name’ the punishment is inflicted” (Feinberg, 2000, p. 689). Punishment is 
intended to uphold the moral order and restore the moral balance through 
infliction of just deserts. “Punishment’s real function is not that of crime control, in 
terms of which it is rather ineffective, but rather that of moral affirmation” 
(Garland, 1999, p.24). Punishment may also have the effect and intention of 
reform (rehabilitation) or deterrence (stopping future harm), but these are 
secondary to its retributive intent (some would say that is its only purpose; see 
Moore, 2000). 3
While detentions and suspensions fit the description of punishment, yet 
are employed by schools for non-moral offenses, each of the schools in our 
scenario initially respond to first or minor offenses with other, seemingly 
rehabilitative, resolutions – conferences, behavioural contracts, reprimands, 
withdrawal of privileges, work details, anger management, peer mediation, social 
skills training, guidance counselor, school nurse, student assistance resource 
program, or outside mental health referrals. At the start of the disciplinary 
process, at least for the wrongs of Susie and Sarah, there is an attempt to 
understand cause, motive, and circumstance. However, as the number of 
recurrences mount, sanctions become more draconian and judgments more 
moralized. The behaviours now are instances of wrongfulness that threaten the 
viability of instruction, the welfare of other students, and the institution itself. 
Punishment is deemed the proper response to these threats. School B is explicit 
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in stating that when an offence is more frequent than covered by the 3-5 day 
detention level, it is considered an act of “insubordination.” What the forger and 
dress code violator share is noncompliance; the noncompliance threatens the 
institution and deserves punishment.  
 Frequency may serve bureaucratic convenience but it is a poor measure 
of moral culpability. Granted, a behaviour does appear more morally offensive as 
it recurs. One is prone, for example, initially to judge a dress code violation as the 
child’s oversight, carelessness, maybe a momentary protest. With repetition it 
becomes disrespectful and defiant; an escalation of sanctions seems 
appropriate. There are everyday parallels: park overtime and receive a ticket, fail 
to pay the ticket(s) and receive an added penalty, become a scofflaw and serve 
time in jail. Whatever the reasonableness of frequency as a scale for calibrating 
degrees of condemnation and sanctions, alone it is insufficient. We recognize a 
categorical difference between over-parking and reckless driving; so too we must 
acknowledge that dress code violations and forgery are differences in kind.  
Conflating conventional with moral rules and rehabilitative with punitive 
sanctions appears to moralize the entirety. One could, however, make the 
opposite judgment: all discipline is assimilated to the conventional. Code 
preambles, for example, may justify respect for property not as an ethical 
obligation but as a means of achieving order. Plainly property rights would be 
enforced as stand-alone moral values even if they were irrelevant to an orderly 
environment, yet schools resort to the amoral language of order perhaps out of 
discomfort with "punishment" (and "moral"). 
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Discipline codes stress an anti-punitive approach: “Positive rather than 
negative measures shall form the basis of our disciplinary procedures,” says one 
district. Another: "It is the position of the school that the punitive aspect of 
discipline should be a last resort."  And another: “The disciplinary process is 
intended to be instructional and corrective, not punitive.” The codes prefer such 
terms as, “disciplinary response,” “disciplinary action,” “disciplinary 
consequences,”  “penalties,” “procedures,” “interventions,” “options,” 
“measures.” Consequences may be administered for inappropriate behaviour, 
dress, and language; for disrespect, intended deception, property damage, 
plagiarism, and theft thus merging the moral into the non-moral. Reducing 
discipline to classroom management avoids punishment but reduces its moral 
clout. (For a thorough contemporary discipline review see Bear, 1998). 
Separating punishment from deterrence and rehabilitation, and moral from 
conventional rules would clarify the differences between moral and conventional 
rules for students. 4 Punishment, whose primary purpose is to alter conscience 
rather than change behaviour should be considered only for the former. The 
question outstanding is whether the necessary distinctions can be made? Take, 
for example, the matter of tardiness. For John Dewey promptness serves the 
convenience of the school not the betterment of the child (1954), hence it is 
merely an administrative convention. But is that right?  For Emile  Durkheim 
(1961/1925) promptness is character building and a school's moral obligation to 
enforce.  
Making distinctions: The derivatively moral 
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For some tardiness is a moral wrong; for others a conventional wrong; for 
still others no wrong at all. Nel Noddings, proponent of the ethic of care finds 
tardiness unworthy of rule-making. Writing of her own experience she explains: 
Periodically, high school faculties become upset by student 
tardiness to classes. A crackdown usually results in careful record 
keeping and prescribed penalties. The name of every tardy student 
is listed on a slip that is collected and recorded in a central office. I 
resisted this practice. I told my students that I would start on time 
and that I expected that they, too, would be present and ready for 
action. I suggested that we leave a few seats near the door for 
those who might be unavoidably late. Latecomers were to take 
seats quietly and wait for a break in procedures to ask their 
neighbors what they missed. This worked well. Kids responded with 
respect to my respect for them (2002, p.202). 
When students are persistently tardy, teachers of Noddings’ perspective 
might investigate possible causes – the school schedule is too tight, conditions at 
home are chaotic, the child is not a good judge of time, is academically weak and 
reluctant to attend class – all potentially resolvable problems. The lateness is a 
problem to remediate, not a wrong to punish.   
Those who put a higher premium on promptness, yet still see it as serving 
school routines, will establish rules with non-punitive sanctions such as allowing 
a tardy child to join the group, perhaps with a request to be more mindful in the 
future.  According to this view, tardiness is distracting and bothersome but merits 
 13
no more moral obloquy than lateness to a public event: delay in admission. If 
lateness persists, the child might be excluded from class with no provision for 
make-up work, but not detained or suspended. Hopefully, the natural 
consequences – missing instruction, doing poorly on a test, the displeasure of 
classmates – will exert a remedial influence. 
A third teacher believes that tardiness is moral misbehaviour. For her, 
promptness is not only integral to the development of good work habits and 
required for worldly success, but central to the schools ethos, an obligation 
arising from society’s compulsory education mandate. The child who “gets away” 
with lateness not only compromises this mandate but is a free-loader for 
pervasive tardiness undermines the entire curriculum and schedule. Tardiness 
also derogates a teacher’s status and the worth of her teaching. One with this 
mind-set has a high threshold for exculpating explanations. While wanting to be 
sure the tardiness is within the child’s capacity to prevent, the presumption would 
be that the child is not taking responsibility for a major social obligation. As 
incidents accumulate, the teacher interprets them as defiant and insolent, 
undermining the authority and obedience she is due. Rather than ignore lateness 
or apply natural consequences, she prefers, as do Wynne and Ryan, “for the 
school and the teachers to establish a simple, unpleasant, and prompt system of 
consequences for tardy students” (1997, p.90). “Unpleasant,” one assumes, 
because deserving of punishment.   
There is legitimacy to the interpretations of our third teacher as well as to 
the others. But note they are interpretations. Unlike “busting” a kids’ nose, the 
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harm of tardiness usually resides in the perception; it is indirect. While insolence 
belongs in the moral realm – it intentionally injures – merely entering a class late, 
even repeatedly, need not be so interpreted. We must distinguish direct 
indicators of insolence – the child mocks the teacher, disrupts activities, projects 
an unmistakable “attitude” – from an assumption of insolence premised simply on 
a rule violation. Is a child insolent who despite repeated instruction always has a 
sloppy desk?  Perhaps, if his resistance is intended as impudence; perhaps not, 
if he is skill-deficient, forgetful, or unmotivated. Is a child insolent who chews 
gum, is told to get rid of it, and repeats the offence? Chewing gum may be 
repugnant to the teacher, messy, in bad taste, but to the child the prohibition is 
silly and the violation not intended as an insult. There are multiple explanations 
for repeatedly disregarding instructions, insolence is only one.   
Teachers, one must appreciate, are under substantial duress from 
children’s behaviour. According to a survey by the nonpartisan opinion research 
organization Public Agenda, “1 in 3 teachers say they have seriously considered 
quitting the profession – or know a colleague who has left – because student 
discipline and behaviour became so intolerable” (2004, p.3). Who would blame 
them for being hyper-alert to mischievous, provocative, and disobedient children, 
even excessively zealous in reading insolence into noncompliance? But the 
hazard of overdoing the “bad kid” response is that one may instigate the very 
behaviour one is trying to eliminate. That is not to say rules regarding gum 
chewing and orderly desks should be abolished, although all conventions should 
be regularly reviewed. Rather, because in themselves they are conventions 
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without moral valence, without a clear indicator of insolence, they fall into the 
problem-to-be-solved category, not the wrong-to-be-punished. The same, I 
believe is true of tardiness. 
Tardiness, along with many school rules (dress codes, eating in class, 
talking in class, street language), occupies a gray area between the clearly moral 
and the clearly conventional, what can be called the derivatively moral. Rather 
than a direct and intentional harmful act, it is ambiguous behaviour relying 
heavily on interpretation for its moral status. The teacher either infuses the act 
with a moral judgment or takes moral offense from the repetition of the act. A 
derivatively immoral act, highly reliant on circumstances and motives, should not 
be treated as intrinsically immoral, something to be prohibited and punished 
categorically; it requires a case by case examination. By contrast, a forged note 
dupes the person whose name is forged and the recipient. It gives the forger an 
unfair advantage. The duping, the advantage, and the breach of trust apply as 
well to most cheating, stealing, and lying. These wrongs do not have to be 
interpreted as hurtful, they are inherently so, just as delivering (purposefully) a 
punch in the eye or taunting the disabled. Beyond harm to individuals, and to a 
much greater extent than tardiness, such offences tear into the social contract 
that binds the community.  
The derivatively moral is the transformation of a conventional rule, 
perhaps important to the smooth function of an institution, into a moral 
transgression. Restricting eating to the cafeteria, for example, may be critical to a 
school, yet still a rule of convenience. One could imagine another school that, 
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without undermining student morality, allows children to snack in classrooms. 
When teachers say, as they often do, “I don’t care what you do outside of school 
but here the rule is ...” they implicitly recognize the localization 
(conventionalization) of school rules. It is unlikely they would say, “I don’t care if 
you bully, cheat or steal outside, but in school it is not allowed.” However, 
repeated violations of a cafeteria-only eating rule comes to be understood by 
school authorities as disobedience, and failure to obey the rule (or the authority) 
as insolence.  
The charge of insolence from repeated violation of a rule is one route by 
which a sometimes immoral act can be converted into a categorical moral 
offense. The transformation may also occur when moral coloration is given to a 
morally ambiguous norm. Our third teacher above, for example, believes that 
tardiness, like lying, violates the moral order; others do not. Many disciplinary 
rules fall into a moral penumbra: moving about the classroom, passing notes, 
talking out of turn, talking too loudly, not holding doors. While at most only mildly 
injurious to others, they can be judged inconsiderate. Some schools might allow 
such behaviours while prohibiting the more obvious moral offenses – bullying, 
cheating, stealing, lying, vandalism. Even “bad” language, a serious 
misbehaviour for most schools, is often derivatively, not inherently, immoral. If 
using “fuck” is part of your speech pattern, not intended as an insult, there’s no 
harm. The harm resides in the teacher’s finding it offensive or insulting. That it is 
“inappropriate” at school, a cause for rejection in applying to jobs, or irksome to 
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teachers does not make it immoral until it is so interpreted. As with tardiness, bad 
language can be directly abusive, it is just not necessarily so in all instances. 
In practice it may be extremely difficult, at times impossible, to delineate 
the derivatively moral; so much depends on context and motive. When for 
example is a teacher entitled to hold a child morally accountable for offending 
her? What if he takes issue with a historical analysis she makes? Still, the 
category merits attention for so many school offenses fall within this domain. 
They are what give an accordion structure to school morality, expanding and 
contracting at adult discretion. 
Yet we cannot ignore the fact that some are offended by the language, 
dress, and tardiness of others either because they demonstrate insolence when 
repeated or, as they judge it, are moral failings. The teacher might have chosen 
to interpret the conduct otherwise, but hasn’t. When a child persistently offends, 
he is not blameless. The harm, of course, may be justified by another value, say 
free speech, or it may be unintentional. More likely it is the product of insensitive 
carelessness. Carelessness then drifts into indifference, indifference into 
insolence. Unwillingness to bend to the scruples of one’s teachers, unless those 
scruples conflict with one’s own – not likely with tardiness, language and dress – 
is morally insensitive. The derivatively moral is both derivative and moral.   
Adults, however, need to be cautious in making the “you are insolent” or 
“I’m offended” claim, for these judgments will serve as cover to justify any rule, 
any sanction. Exacting submission to weakly rationalized authority undermines 
the deliberative process. Better children should reflect on the moral status of 
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tardiness and the appropriate sanctions than receive automatic detentions 
because the teacher, using a derivatively moral argument, insists. As the 
educational philosopher Roger Straughan reminds us, “nothing is ever made 
right by someone saying it is right" (1988, p.6).  "[A] system of control which tries 
to transmit a particular code of conduct to children, simply by pointing to the fact 
that that code is prescribed by some authority, cannot claim to be doing anything 
that can be called either moral or educational.” (1988, pp.76-77).   
We pay a price, then, for upholding too high, as well as too low, 
expectations of considerateness. To act selfishly is part of the human condition. 
Every time we fail to recycle waste, overuse gas or water, exclude an 
acquaintance who would wish to be included we are "inconsiderate." Children 
should not, but often are, expected to be kinder than adults.  
Making distinctions: Sanctions as punishments or penalties 
The moral, derivatively moral, and merely conventional can be made 
distinguishable to students through sanctions. Punishment, in its purest sense, 
has the following reciprocal characteristics: The punisher’s intention is to 
denounce a student’s wrong-doing and to prevent erosion of the community’s 
fundamental values, erosion that will occur if moral violations go unpunished. The 
recipient acknowledges culpability and experiences remorsefulness; there is 
rebalancing of the moral scales, and reaffirmation of the standard that was 
violated. If a student is indifferent to the condemnation – indeed takes pride in 
disobedience – and indifferent to the restrictions (detentions and suspensions), 
then there may be punitive intent, but no punitive effect. 
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Whether detentions and suspensions, despite their appearance, are even 
intended as punishment is uncertain. Coming, as they often do, after a series of 
milder interventions have failed, they appear to express exasperation and 
rebuke, as well as a desire to protect the authority of the disciplinarian and the 
rule from abuse. This could be interpreted as punitive intent, but of a weak 
variety.  Because the student’s culpability is largely disobedience and the 
sanction’s objective largely control, moral condemnation, if it exists, is secondary 
to law enforcement, placing in jeopardy the perception of punitive intent. Nor do 
these sanctions appear to have a remedial intent. If the objective of sanctioning 
tardiness is to resolve a persistent problem, suspension and detention are 
unlikely choices for they are unresponsive to the cause and motive. While they 
may deter – depending on whether the student feels liberated or intimidated by 
the sanction – the discipline is more temporary “fix” than resolution. 
School sanctions may better be described as penalties, the payment one 
makes for pursuing a prohibited interest – a fine for the overdue library book. 
Because they are administered for non-moral wrongs and do not carry the 
reprobative symbolism of punishment (Feinberg, 2000), no remorse 
accompanies penalties. The distinction between penalty and punishment once 
again is perceptual. Sanctions for rule-breaking will be experienced solely as 
penalties unless they are accepted as moral condemnation. As P. S. Wilson 
notes:  
One is penalized for failing to behave in a way which neither you 
nor your judge necessarily regard as being of any intrinsic  
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importance (e.g. feeding a parking meter), but one is punished by 
someone with whom one claims to share an interest but towards 
whom one has failed to behave in a way appropriate to the interest 
which you share. A penalty is a disadvantage, in respect of the 
pursuit of personal goals. A punishment is more likely a timely 
reminder of what one's personal goals are (1971, pp. 117-118). 5
 Neither severity nor type of sanction necessarily determines punitiveness. 
Any particular sanction can be punitive in some circumstances, not others, 
depending on intent. Take the popular device of “time-out.” Because it isolates a 
child who has misbehaved and deprives him of peer interaction, some see time-
out as a punishment (Kohn, 1996; Preuesse, 2004); others as rehabilitative, even 
protective. “Time-outs,” says Ruth Charney, “can establish the safety nets and 
boundaries of rules, while promoting the incentive and dignity of self-control” 
(1991, p.94). For Charney, time-out is encased in compassion: empathy for the 
rule-breaker, eagerness to help the child recover control, faith in the students’ 
ability to return to the group. For Kohn, time-out is pure coercion, “forcing [the 
child] to sit by himself….telling the child, ‘Do it my way or leave’”(1996, p.46).
 One suspects that for children attending U.S. public schools tardiness and 
improper dress rules are conventions without moral standing (see Nucci, 2001). 
Detentions and suspensions for breaching such rules are therefore experienced 
as penalties without retributive bite or remorse. The school “is merely pricing, not 
sanctioning, offenders’ behaviour” (Kahan, 1996, p.652); fines would do as well. 
Penalties do not influence character, if anything they undermine it. The child 
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considers only whether he wants to pay the cost of breaking the rule. If the cost 
is sufficiently high he refrains, but this is a purely self-interested calculation 
without any chastening.  
Although penalties are to be avoided for moral offences, they have a role 
in correcting conventional wrongs. When a child forgets his pencils for the third 
time, the teacher penalizes him by not resupplying them; when repeatedly tardy, 
by exclusion from class; when repeatedly in breech of the dress code, by 
insisting he keep an extra outfit in his locker. There is no shame-on-you, no 
denunciation or outrage, just a matter-of-fact penalty intended to discourage the 
act.  
Something else may be in order for the student who bullies, hurts, lies, 
cheats, steals, or vandalizes. If the act was committed knowingly and willfully, 
punishment is a candidate, but what does it mean for a child to act knowingly and 
willfully? To be morally accountable a student must fully appreciate the harm she 
inflicted and have intended the injury. The act cannot be, even partially, unwitting 
or impulsive; it has to be calculated. These criteria, if we follow the analyses of 
Piaget and Kohlberg, would largely eliminate punishment for children up to their 
teen years. When one incorporates such capacities as knowledge, intention, 
judgment, and self-control into the act, not all instances of hitting, cheating, lying 
etc. will be classifiable as moral wrongs. (See Goodman and Lesnick, 2001 and 
2004 for a fuller discussion of moral wrong.) However, children can be knowingly 
and willfully malicious; therefore deserving of punishment.  Waiting in the wings to 
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taunt and bully children with special needs fits the requirements for a punitive 
sanction.  
Rethinking school discipline   
While the Deweyian notion of discipline placed it largely outside the moral 
domain, its present moral status is muddled. The codes seem both to lean 
towards, and pull away from moralizing wrong-doing. Although obedience and 
control are cited as imperatives, whether they are moral values is obscure. 
Sometimes they appear as non-moral goods instrumental to education – one 
cannot learn in a disordered environment – sometimes as independent moral 
goods – disobedience is a manifestation of insolence.  Moral fudging continues in 
the codes’ articulation of school objectives: whether, for example, “decency” 
(Sizer, 1992) is a self-sustaining goal to be cultivated by the school or simply a 
means to sustain academic ends. 
The blending of customary and moral violations, with frequency rather 
than content determinative of sanctions, further blurs morality, as does the 
selection of sanctions. Schools appear to establish an ambient morality by using 
detentions and suspensions to punish students for rule infringements, yet they 
denounce punishment. Perhaps that is just as well, for students will not 
experience punishment without accepting rules as morally binding and 
administrators as morally legitimate authorities.  
The final confusion is the transformation of conventional rules, perhaps 
important to the smooth function of an institution, into moral transgressions, 
yielding the derivatively moral domain. While to some extent unavoidable, the 
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ongoing process of transformation leaves everyone in a state of limbo. When will 
an act be taken by an authority as insolent or inconsiderate? When will it be 
brushed off as unimportant or simply a custom to be followed at school? Worse, 
the derivatively moral has no natural boundaries permitting schools to expand 
their authority while compressing student opinions and options: whatever speech 
the teacher finds offensive is deemed insulting and therefore punishable. 
While one must recognize the hubris of making recommendations free of 
any responsibility for institutionalizing them, the academic perch permits a 
perspective on ground-level practices. In that spirit, this conclusion is intended as 
aspirational rather then prescriptive.  
If discipline is to be other than power-wielding, it must be nested in larger 
purposes. Schools should be encouraged to expose their moral objectives to all 
concerned – teachers, parents, children – and preserve them as independent of, 
not secondary to or rationalized by, academic pursuits – although curriculum and 
teaching methods are an obvious expression of the objectives. (See Goodman 
and Lesnick, 2001 and 2004.) Going public with the moral goals of education 
would afford students the opportunity to align themselves with moral purposes 
now obscure. Without such an alignment, students are likely to perceive much of 
school authority as illegitimate, punishment as undeserved, and obedience as 
involuntary.  
As part of going public, schools also need to clarify and tighten the 
connection between school objectives and discipline. Offenses against school 
rules must be distinguished from moral wrongs such as cheating and forgery. 
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The blurring of ethical distinctions is extremely unhelpful to children’s moral 
development. When tardiness and dress are made equivalent to cheating and 
forgery children are unlikely to appreciate any overriding claims of moral 
obligations.  Similarly, a snugger fit between disciplinary interventions and the 
content of misconduct is in order. A child is persistently tardy. The question is 
why? Is it a problem within the family, inadequate transportation, poor 
scheduling, the teacher’s conduct of the class, the pressure of friendships, faulty 
time-keeping, an “attitude”? Given the cause(s), what procedures would best 
ameliorate the problem? Hold a conversation with the parents, get an alarm 
clock, request help from a buddy, offer positive reinforcement, seat the child 
inside the door, count missed work against grades, require make-up work? The 
intent is remedial rather than punitive.  
Greater distinctions in offenses and treatment would yield a fair degree of 
diversity, yet not complete diversity. Because people disagree on what 
constitutes the moral, especially the derivatively moral, some schools would 
place acts of inconsiderateness, for example, in the moral realm, others under 
school rules. Yet who would not place cheating, plagiarism, forgery, vandalism, 
and non-trivial violence in the morally impermissible category? Sanctions, too, 
with their dependence on intent and reception, would carry various connotations. 
We have reviewed the ambiguity of time-out, detentions and suspensions. Are 
they primarily penalties or punishments? Are they intended to deter recidivism, 
shape character, imbue remorse?  Much depends on the spirit in which they are 
administered and interpretations made by the recipient. But the diversity of 
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classifications is hardly a misfortune. It responds to our moral pluralism, while the 
commonalities respond to our fundamental agreements. 
A persuasive disciplinary policy will be restrained; adult authority 
circumspect, not squandered. There needs to be containment of the derivatively 
moral and enlargement of non-rule governed space where children can reflect, 
experiment, and discover.  Minimizing claims of insolence and 
inconsiderateness, premised as they are on dubious authority, would help. 
Maximizing engagement of children in aspects of discipline would be another 
step. Class meetings, student government, student disciplinary bodies, 
alternative dispute resolutions contribute to the sense of “us,” so essential to the 
student-adult-school moral alignment. 
 Along with fewer rules and constrained authority punishment should be 
limited, for it is demoralizing to adults while promoting rebellion and alienation in 
students.  “Wherever there is moral regulation there is resistance; whatever 
social forms are imposed there is human capacity to subvert and exceed their 
constraints” (Rousmaniere, Dehli, de Coninck-Smith, 1997, p.5). The practice of 
detentions and suspensions for repeated commissions of misconduct conveys a 
picture of schools under siege, a failed collaboration between students and 
administrators. Children are not morally culpable for most of the “wrongs” at 
school. Though told constantly to take responsibility for making “the right 
choices,” in fact, their freedom of choice is circumscribed. Over a long 
developmental period children are not fully independent moral agents. The “right” 
is largely, if not completely, heteronomously defined. They have minimal 
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capacities for non self-interested deliberation, and even less to join rational 
conclusions with actions. They are impulsive, erratic, irrational, egocentric, and 
easily influenced. They make mistakes because they are young, not bad. Usually 
our interventions should offer support and guidance. Sometimes, however, they 
are culpable and a just, if mild, punishment is in order.  
As an example I offer the following from Marilyn Watson’s recent work with 
Laura Ecken (LE), a teacher/collaborator. Martin, an aggressive elementary 
school child, repeatedly suspended, provoked a fight and injured (mildly) 
Jennifer. In conversation with LE the next day, Martin admits that although he 
was not hurt by Jennifer, she was hurt by him. Teacher and student discuss 
alternative ways of behaving. Then the following exchange occurs: 
 I [LE] asked him [Martin] to think about what he could do to make 
this up to her, but he couldn’t think of anything. I said, ‘Well, you 
need to sit down a little while. I want you to think about how you 
can make it up to Jennifer for what you did to her yesterday’….Well, 
he couldn’t think of anything except to tell her that he was sorry. I 
asked if I could help him think of something more and he agreed. I 
suggested that he could offer to get her book box for her every day 
when it’s time for book boxes (Watson, 2003, p.174).  
When Martin did not get past, “I’m really sorry I hit you in the face and I 
won’t do it again” (p.175), LE reminded him of the book box offer. After failing to 
carry it out, LE told Jennifer what Martin had agreed to and insisted Martin 
declare the commitment to Jennifer, which he did. 
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Fetching the book box seems to me a justifiable retributive punishment. 
Underneath the veneer of consultation, LE is imposing a demand well beyond 
addressing the cause or context of the conflict. To balance the wrong Martin has 
wrought, she deems an apology insufficient. He must perform a service for 
Jennifer, presumably not to his liking. Although LE speaks of the need to “make 
this up to her,” one is hard put to believe Jennifer cares if Martin fetches her 
books or not. Nor is it likely that the deed, mandated by the teacher, will salve her 
grievance, but this is not central. The “making up” is less directed to appeasing 
Jennifer than to satisfying the moral community, injured when Martin violated its 
values. There were non-punitive alternatives available to LE – keeping the 
children apart, supervising them more carefully, talking it over, getting 
suggestions from them, inducing empathy, asking for (not demanding) an 
apology. That LE went beyond them is indicative of her (though perhaps not 
others’) conviction that more was at stake. 
 A deft, moderate, tailored disciplinary policy will take into consideration all 
components of conduct – context, motive, knowledge, norms – as well as the 
moral seriousness of a child’s misbehaviour. This entails backing away from our 
dominant bureaucratic-centered system that calibrates sanctions to frequency of 
occurrence. It also demands a radical decentralization of discipline. 
Notwithstanding the requirements of equity and due process, and excepting 
behaviours that violate the law, teachers should be granted expanded authority 
to determine interventions. It is they who know the situation best and can make 
the necessary distinctions if given supplemental education to do so. It is 
 28
commonplace to read that teachers should model morality. That they should 
determine sanctions is less frequently asserted, presumably because we are 
uncomfortable leaving such judgments to the idiosyncrasies of individuals and 
concerned with the likely inequities in outcomes. Precautions can be taken 
against these risks, however, without removing disciplinary decisions from 
teachers. We rely on them to articulate the school’s moral objectives for children 
and it is their persuasiveness that will determine the children’s allegiance. That 
persuasiveness consists, in part, in how they react to wrongdoing. Rather than 
referring the offender to a central office, they need to show children that one has 
different reactions to moral wrongs – disappointment, disapproval, anger, 
indignation – than to time-table errors. This includes, on occasion, showing moral 
outrage through anger and indignation. 
There are delicate uncertain lines to be drawn between moral, nonmoral 
and derivatively moral wrongs, between children’s agency and dependency, 
between teacher-based and principle-based authority, between individualizing 
and equalizing responses, between punitive and non-punitive sanctions. 
Determinations will always be subject to criticism and on-going review. However, 
when every rule is a moral obligation and every infraction elicits moral blame, 
students are poorly equipped to differentiate amongst wrongs – the 
administratively efficient from the morally injurious – and, in any case, will have 
little motivation to try, for morality is trivialized when so extended. 
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End Notes 
 
1Although within schools authorities perceive order as an obvious requirement for learning, and so 
obviously justified, on the outside order has its vociferous critics. “Teachers who declare their comfort 
zone as one defined by quiet require of all students who walk into the classroom that they be quiet. There 
is no concern whether that paradigm works against students' ability to learn. Too often the methods 
employed to achieve a quiet, obedient classroom are detrimental to building a climate in which every 
student can learn successfully….Constantly quiet classrooms look as they do because the students are 
being controlled through fear, intimidation, frequent appeals to competition, and public embarrassment. 
While any of the above approaches may be deemed to 'work,' inasmuch as they are effective tools for 
control, they most often work against students who already find themselves on the fringe of the school's 
environment. While some students may be willing to bend to the control systems practiced by educators, 
particularly when those practices are consonant with the homes from which the students come, there are 
others who will view imposed, arbitrary rules as a call to arms” (McEwan, 1998, p.143). 
 
2 Of ten districts that listed rules by levels and included both cheating and dress violations, six 
had both at the lowest level, one listed dress as more serious, three cheating as more serious.  
 
3 Not everyone agrees that punishment emphasizes retribution rather than deterrence. Richard 
Smith, for example, argues that the purpose of punishment “is to secure greater obedience to 
laws and rules by deterring offenders, both those who have already offended from doing so again 
and those who so far have not but might if not deterred” (1985, p.69). Peters (1967) also speaks 
to the behaviour-changing purposes of punishment. While recognizing the deterrent and 
rehabilitative aspects of punishment I have chosen to emphasize its retributive looking-backward 
functions so as to link it with moral wrong-doing. Punishing children, I believe, should be rare in 
school, reserved for those misdeeds that demand moral accountability; narrowing its meaning is a 
step toward narrowing and clarifying its scope.  
 
4 Mary Warnock (1977) argues that school rules should be restricted to "convenience, safety, 
orderliness and other such non-moral considerations" (p.137). However, "[a] rule against bullying 
or theft would be an absurdity. It would suggest that the school had made the rule for some 
reason of convenience and that, apart from the existence of the rule, there might be nothing 
against bullying or theft…. A teacher would have failed in his duty if all he had succeeded in 
passing on to his pupils was that certain forms of behaviour were 'ruled out' (p.138) 
  
5 Richard Smith (1985) takes issue with Wilson’s distinction between penalties and punishments. 
He argues penalties are only demanded for acts that are wrongful. “[I]f I leave my car [in front of 
my house] for the sake of convenience, confident that police or traffic-wardens rarely come past, I 
am acting selfishly and risking causing an accident. If I keep my one-week loan for longer, 
deciding it’s well worth the fine, I am keeping it from another reader who might well have planned 
his work on the assumption that the book would be back when it was due. Similarly with offences 
against the smooth running of the classroom or school: if they really matter, if for example they 
selfishly cause inconvenience to other people, let us think of detention or whatever as a 
punishment….If on the other hand they matter only a little or not at all let us scrap the relevant 
rule or respond with remonstrance, reminder, reasoning or in some other way. Thus penalties are 
confusing because they convey the message that the behaviour penalized does not really matter, 
while the child still finds itself on the receiving end of what looks remarkably like a punishment” 
(p.67). I find this partially persuasive. True, penalties are given for inconsiderate behaviour but 
inconsideration is only a minor moral wrong. While selfishness annoys us, we are accustomed to 
it, granting people some moral slack. Morality slides into politeness which slides into the 
customary; we all draw our own lines yet agree that there is a continuum of greater to lesser 
offences.  
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